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Due to the large stored energies in both magnets and particle beams, the Large Hadron Collider (LHC)
requires a large inventory of machine protection systems, as e.g. powering interlock systems, based on a
series of distributed industrial controllers for the protection of the more than 10’000 normal and
superconducting magnets. Such systems are required to be at the same time fast, reliable and secure but also
flexible and configurable to allow for automated commissioning, remote monitoring and optimization during
later operation. Based on the generic hardware architecture of the LHC machine protection systems
presented at EPAC 2002 [2] and ICALEPS 2003, the use of configuration data for protection systems in
view of the required reliability and safety is discussed. To achieve the very high level of reliability, it is
required to use a coherent description of the layout of the accelerator components and of the associated
machine protection architecture and their logical interconnections. Mechanisms to guarantee coherency of
data and repositories and secure configuration of safety critical systems are presented. This paper focuses on
the first system being commissioned, the complex magnet powering system, to become fully operational
before first injection of beam into the LHC.
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 Due to the large stored energies in both magnets and 
particle beams, the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) requires 
a large inventory of machine protection systems, as e.g. 
powering interlock systems, based on a series of 
distributed industrial controllers for the protection of the 
more than 10’000 normal and superconducting magnets. 
Such systems are required to be at the same time fast, 
reliable and secure but also flexible and configurable to 
allow for automated commissioning, remote monitoring 
and optimization during later operation. 
Based on the generic hardware architecture of the LHC 
machine protection systems presented at EPAC 2002 [2] 
and ICALEPS 2003, the use of configuration data for 
protection systems in view of the required reliability and 
safety is discussed. To achieve the very high level of 
reliability, it is required to use a coherent description of 
the layout of the accelerator components and of the 
associated machine protection architecture and their 
logical interconnections. Mechanisms to guarantee 
coherency of data and repositories and secure 
configuration of safety critical systems are presented. This 
paper focuses on the first system being commissioned, the 
complex magnet powering system, to become fully 
operational before first injection of beam into the LHC. 
THE LHC MAGNET POWERING 
SYSTEM  
 The powering system of the LHC is of unprecedented 
complexity, including more than 10’000 superconducting 
and normal conducting magnets distributed around the 
LHC circumference of 27 km. The interconnection of the 
superconducting magnets throughout the continuous 
cryostats is done with more than 80’000 splices and they 
are connected via a large number of HTS current leads 
and air and water cooled cables to more than 1700 
different power converters, located in the LHC 
underground areas and in various surface buildings.  
The concept of powering subsectors  
In order to limit the stored energies in the electrical 
circuits and to avoid cables carrying high currents across 
the insertions, the main magnets are powered separately 
in each of the eight symmetrical sectors. In each sector 
there are several cryostats housing the magnets, in total 
more than 40 around the LHC. In order to further simplify 
installation, commissioning and operation, the powering 
system is subdivided into 28 powering subsectors for the 
superconducting magnets and 8 powering subsectors for 
normal conducting magnets. For the protection of the 
described magnet powering system of the LHC, a 
dedicated Powering Interlock System has been put in 
place, interfacing with the power converters, the quench 
protection system (QPS) and energy extraction facilities 
to assure the protection of magnets and electrical 
equipment [3]. The system is based on 44 industrial 
controllers, installed in a number of racks located in 
various LHC underground areas, whereas the installations 
and the protection process have to be customized 
depending on the layout of the machine and the connected 
user systems and devices [4].  
THE LHC FUNCTIONAL LAYOUT 
DATABASE 
Machine Layouts 
More than 82’000 individual components have to be 
interconnected in the LHC tunnel for magnet powering. In 
view of this complexity and the need for coherent data 
during the installation, commissioning and operation of 
the machine, a complete description of the machine and 
powering layout has been realised in the LHC Functional 
Layout Database [1] [2], representing an essential part of 
the complete database model shown in Figure 1.   
 
 
This layout data is closely related with tools for 
component tracking (assets management), controls 
configuration, operational data and quality assurance.  
Assets Management 
As the protection systems interact closely with the 
installed powering infrastructure, a complete description 
of the machine protection system and its logical 
interconnections with the protected hardware is integrated 
into the layout database. Graphical representations in the 
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Figure 1: The LHC Functional Layout Database 
form of web navigators allow for browsing the variety of 
installations and rack contents as shown in Figure 2 [5]. 
 
Logical connections representing the physically installed 
cables can be defined in between the various components 
management, tracking and unique identification of each 
individual system component throughout their complete 
life-cycle (such as industrial controllers, power supplies, 
PCBs, etc), using dedicated naming conventions and bar 
codes as defined in the LHC quality assurance plan [6]. 
Controls Configuration and Operational Data 
Due to the generic design of the powering interlock 
system, the industrial controllers, programmable logic 
devices and the according supervision application require 
a configuration of the process with respect to the 
particularities of the electrical circuits to be protected in 
the powering subsector. 
This configuration data (i.e. the part for physical I/O 
addresses) is derived from the system layout and the 
defined logical interconnections. In addition, a number of 
operational parameters are included for each electrical 
circuit, determining the final process parameters for its 
protection.     
Operational data hereby also includes the definition of 
alarms being sent to the operators in the control room and 
a consistent naming of each individual signal of the 
protection systems. Such a naming scheme will allow the 
operators and system experts an easy access and analysis 
of the Post Mortem Data, based on automated tools. The 
history of all interlock signals is captured in the SCADA 
system and sent for long time storage to the LHC Logging 
Database.   
Although the most basic protection features are always 
assured by the hardware level of the machine protection 
systems, the coherency and correctness of process data in 
the different components of the protection system is vital 
for the safety, reliability and in particular the availability 
for operation of the powering interlock system. To ensure 
this, a single data source is used for the generation of the 
various configuration data blocks and several verification 
mechanisms are applied throughout the generation, 
downloading and use of the configuration data as 
described in the following section. 
MECHANISMS FOR SECURE 
CONFIGURATION 
Data Verification  within the  LHC Functional 
Layout Databases   
Ensuring consistency and correctness of data is a major 
challenge and has to start at the very source of the 
configuration process. A unique source of data and clear 
interdependencies in between the various parts of a 
database model are a pre-requisite for a reliable 
configuration process. 
To ensure the correctness of layout data in the LHC 
Functional Layout Databases, a rigorous versioning 
scheme is applied, including a series of verification 
mechanisms and an approval process before the migration 
to a new data version is approved. 
Generation of Configuration Data  
Based on this layout and configuration data, a dedicated 
generation script will be used to produce the set of 
configuration files for each of the 44 instances of the 
interlock system as shown in Figure 3. It is important to 
note that the generation scripts are part of the controls 
configuration database and that the same mechanisms for 
the tracking of changes are applied as for the data itself.  
A set of configuration files consists hereby out of four 
individual files, one for the configuration of the SCADA 
system (in our case PVSS), one for the PLC process, one 
for the configuration of a programmable logic device and 
one for the configuration of the controls middleware 
(CMW), mainly used during the commissioning process 
of the system. Even if format or content change from one 
file type to another, for consistency the same data source 
is used depending only on the previously defined layout.  
In order to assure coherency of the individual files at 
any time, the set of configuration files will always be 
created in parallel and signed with a Cyclical Redundancy 
Check (CRC). While the individual checksums are written 
to all four configuration files, the configuration file for 
the SCADA system will contain all four checksums of a 
system, as it will assure the overall coherency during 
operation. 
Use of Configuration Data  during 
commissioning  
In order to facilitate and speed up the commissioning of 
the interlock systems, procedures have been put in place 
which allow for a semi-automatic testing of the interlock 
functionalities (with the exception of some main circuits 
where the manual intervention of specialists is inevitable). 
This automated test functionality is performed by a high 
level tool with access to all involved client systems 
through the controls middle ware (CMW). 
Figure 2: Layout of Powering Interlock Systems and 
Controls Navigator of the Functional Layout Database 
of the equipment systems. Dedicated tools allow for the 
machine 
 The communication towards the involved hardware is 
derived from the same layout data in a dedicated CMW 
configuration file. In order to allow for a maximum of 
flexibility during the dynamic commissioning period 
(where many circuits will have to be temporarily 
suspended from the test procedures for fault finding and 
repair), the CMW configuration will be adapted to the 
currently active set of circuits under test. During the 
commissioning phase, any active CMW configuration is 
clearly made visible via the SCADA system. 
After the successful commissioning of a complete 
instance of the powering interlock system, the CMW 
configuration is removed in order to avoid any 
interactions with an operational system other than via the 
dedicated SCADA system. The same procedures will later 
on be used to efficiently re-commission the interlock 
system after shut-downs and possible modifications. 
Use of Configuration Data during machine 
operation and maintenance  
Once the powering interlock controllers have been 
commissioned for a certain configuration, the according 
set of configuration data is stored in a dedicated 
repository, allowing for a chronological history of the file 
versions. 
 To maintain the high level of security, none of the 
configuration files is to be changed during operation 
without repeating the commissioning procedures for this 
system. Nevertheless one will encounter situations where 
a configuration file has to be reloaded (e.g. after the 
replacement of a faulty PLC unit) or operational 
parameters are to be changed to optimize beam operation. 
While a simple re-configuration of a PLC is done with 
commissioned configuration blocks from the repository, 
any change of layout data or operational parameters has to 
be done via the creation and commissioning of a new set 
of configuration files.  
Once downloaded, the SCADA system will repetitively 
verify the coherency of all active configuration files. The 
various components of the interlock system publish the 
versions and checksums of their current configuration and 
the SCADA system will compare this data against its own 
configuration file, containing the expected checksums of 
the related components. In addition the IP addresses of the 
PLC and the SCADA system of the communicating 
components will be included in the configuration file to 
avoid erroneous download to a wrong device. 
As by design the SCADA system is not involved in the 
safety critical functions of the system but only required 
for monitoring and start-up procedures of magnet 
powering, a verification of the configuration data is 
performed every time before circuit powering is permitted 
for any of the electrical circuits. If any of the 
configurations has changed when starting a new machine 
cycle, the SCADA system will inhibit powering of any of 
the circuits of this device. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In view of the required dependability of the LHC 
interlock systems, secure configuration of the various 
interacting system levels is vital. A completely data driven 
mechanism has been put in place for the controls 
configuration of the powering interlock system, allowing 
for flexibility during the installation, commissioning and 
operation of the protection system whilst maintaining the 
required level of safety. Changes of any layout or 
operational data will be directly propagated to all system 
levels and the coherency of the operated data sets are 
continuously verified by the SCADA system. 
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